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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 07/02/2008 Accident number: 558 
Accident time: 14:40 Accident Date: 09/07/2007 
Where it occurred: Task CBU 204 Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: 10/07/2007 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMAS 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: DPICM M77 
submunition 
Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
trees 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 07/02/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files and 
pictures. Its conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has been 
lost. The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files 
are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. 
Internal report 
To: [Name removed] TOM [International demining NGO], [Name removed] Acting TOM 
[International demining NGO] Lebanon 
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From: [Name removed] TFM, [International demining NGO] Lebanon  
Date: 10 July2007 
Attachment:  Amendment SOP 401 Demolitions Sep 2006. 
Re: Minor fragmentation injury on civilian [the Victim] during [International demining NGO] 
Demolitions on 09 July at task CBU 204. 
General information: 
[International demining NGO] Team 12 and 10 are both working on CBU 204. The Supervisor 
is [Name removed]. The UXO found are M77. 
 
Events leading up to the incident: 
A TV crew from Orange TV, [Name removed] was on site doing a story about clearance. 
MACC SL CLO [Name removed] and his LMAC counterpart accompanied them. TFM [Name 
removed] was also on site to support this visit. 
The Supervisor covered normal site brief and a field visit was conducted as well. 
During the field visit the TFM inspected two M77 and both were pointing south. From one of 
these the fragmentation came later at demolition.  
The TV crew expressed wishes to film the demolition and was told that this is only possible 
from a safe distance. The TV crew agreed upon this and was taken to a higher area north of 
the M77s from where they could film and being located at safety distance. Safety distance 
See Annex A. 
The Supervisor told the TFM that the chosen spot (a parallel road UTM 709754-679241) was 
170m from closest M77.  
The Supervisor said he remembered the distance since he was doing demarcation of this 
area not long ago. He measured this with measuring tape. The location is north of the M77 
and steep uphill. The TFM doubted that the distance was 170m but was sure it was more than 
100m and proceeded with the visit plans.  
The Supervisor prepared the demolitions with 3 x 125 g of PE (Swedish sprangdeg) for each 
M77 total 375 g. Meanwhile the TFM controlled the TV crew visit. Just before the first out of 
two separate demolitions, the neighboring landowner [the Victim] arrived at the location of 
[International demining NGO] TFM and TV crew. He stopped his car and was standing next to 
the TFM and observed the demolitions as well. The landowners are constantly moving around 
our operational areas, which is normal for this area. 
 
Incident/Accident: 
Before conducting demolitions the Supervisor contacted the TFM via Field Assistant [Name 
removed] who replied all clear from TFM to Supervisor. The first demolition was carried out on 
one M77 with 125 g PE without any problems. The Supervisor announced the second 
demolition containing two separate M77 and 2 x 125 g about 5 meters apart and fired after 
countdown. Directly after the blast, the civilian [the Victim] turned to the TFM and pointed 
toward his forehead. The TFM noticed a small cut of 2mm in mid forehead. There was a 
minor bleeding and it stopped quickly.  The time was 14.40 PM. [International demining NGO] 
Medic dealt with the injury, [The Victim] received a band aide and then he wanted to leave the 
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site. He did not have any issues towards [International demining NGO] and did not act in a 
strange way intimating shock. 
 
Actions taken by TFM: 
Initially providing care for the civilian with the injury. First verbal report to [International 
demining NGO] HQ in Nabatiyeh and Technical Operations Manager. 
Confirmed distance (with GPS) between the seat of explosion to where the injury occurred. It 
was 115m both times. (Double check) 
Investigated seat of explosion realizing that the Supervisor did not use protective works. 
TFM met with Head of QA, MACC SL and LMAC representatives on site who asked questions 
to the Supervisor and the TFM was told to do an internal report to [International demining 
NGO] TOM who should forward it to QA section MACC SL. 
MACC SL QA suggested disciplinary action (warning) and refresher of safety distances during 
demolition for the Supervisor.   
 
SOP Demolitions M77. 
[International demining NGO] is applying a safety distance amendment from September 2006 
since no such information was available in [International demining NGO] SOP at the start of 
BAC operations last year.  
SOP Amendment regulating Safety distances are found in Annex A. 
The Supervisor was using 125g of PE on each of the M77. This amount is surely enough to 
collapse the copper cone during the destruction to prevent any copper slug to be projected far 
distance. 
 
Probable cause for incident: 
The Supervisor has used the area were the TV crew was positioned as a sentry point on 
some of the previous demolitions. When using it as sentry point he instructs the sentry to be 
behind a concrete building in the field approx 1 meters from the road. The building is outside 
the demarcated are but in vegetated area and not suitable to have visitors walking into. 
The Supervisor was for some reason under the impression that the TFM should hold this 
sentry points during the demolition. This was never agreed upon and the Supervisor was 
totally in charge of this demolition procedure. The TFM do not interfere in this procedure 
because experience has shown that confusion and mistakes are made in a higher degree if 
interfering. The Supervisor did not inform the TFM about any sentry point at that location. The 
TFM was taking care of the visit. 
The TFM was under the impression that the Supervisor would apply protective works i.e. 
sandbags which is a standard operating procedure up to 200m distance from demolition. With 
protective works (100m) it is safe to observe from the mentioned location. 
 
Summary: 
The Supervisor, [Name removed] is a experienced Supervisor in [International demining 
NGO] has completed demolitions safely on daily basis during his employment with 
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[International demining NGO], not only in Lebanon but also in [International demining NGO] 
Iraq where he has been employed since 1996. 
The Supervisor was under the impression that the observers were going to be behind a small 
building close to the road from were they were observing when the demolition took place. The 
building is in unsearched/uncleared area but also outside the demarcated [International 
demining NGO] task.  
For this reason the Supervisor says he did not use protective works i.e. sandbags on this 
demolition. The time for this demolition was 14.40 PM which is after normal working hours 
that ends at 14.30. 
The Supervisor should have completed protective works for two reasons. First to ensure 
minimum fragmentation risk around the seat of explosion and secondly to protect the Lemon 
tree next to the M77.  Protecting capital equipment or agriculture growth is a normal 
procedure in any [International demining NGO] demolition. 
The projectile forming slug (copper cone) was directed away from the observers. 
It is a rare experience to have a fragmentation from a M77 with 125 g PE on top of it at 
demolition to be projected uphill for 115m. This was truly an unfortunate unexpected event 
[The Victim]’s injury was minor and he is not interested in raising any complaints or claims 
against [International demining NGO]. 
The Supervisor has been briefed on this report and complies with it. 
 
Recommendations: 
The Supervisor in charge of this demolition should be disciplined in some degree for not 
making sure concerning sentry duty and the whereabouts of the visit. The Supervisor was 
under the impression that the TFM would carry out the sentry duty since the TV crew and the 
TFM was close to one of the points he normally uses when conducting demolitions on CBU 
204 task.  He also thought that the TFM would take cover behind the building. Unfortunately 
he didn’t inform the TFM about this and relied on this when deciding to disregard protective 
works. 
All [International demining NGO] Supervisory staff should receive refresher training on 
demolition procedures concerning protective works including safety distance guide and how 
to apply this. 
10 July 2007: TFM [International demining NGO] Lebanon, Supervisor Team 12  
 
SOP Amendment 
20 September 2006 
Site Specific Amendment – AREA 7-004 
According to: [International demining NGO] SOP 401 Demolition safety point 13: 
Safety distances will vary according to the actual or perceived threat factors. Distances can 
be reduced depending on the terrain or by using protective works. A guide to the safety 
distances to be used when conducting demolitions is given in Table 1. 
Submunition is not mentioned in current safety distance guide and the following  guide will be 
applied by the  UNOPS contracted [International demining NGO] BAC TEAMS.  
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Type                 Open area              Protective works 
M77                  200m                            100m 
M42                  200m                            100m 
M85                  200m                            100m                                    
BLU 63             200m                            100m                                               
20 Sep 2006: Signed: PM/TOM [International demining NGO] Lebanon 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 732 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: civilian  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: None Time to hospital: Not taken to hospital 
Protection issued: None Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Head 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Victim’s statement 
To: [International demining NGO] 
From: [The Victim] 
Subject: Abdicating 
Date: 10 July 2007 
I am [the Victim], I was injured in a simple scratch in my fore head by a very small fragment 
caused by a demolition conducted by Team 12 which is being supervised by [Name 
removed]. 
Willingly, I came to you to abdicate of all the legal issues related to this incident. 
I willingly abdicate of this case, and I don’t have any allegation on the organisation or 
personally on [Name removed], and the incident was a small one, and personally I don’t give 
it any care. 
I hope that my report will be accepted. 
 
Analysis 
While the Victim’s injury was minor, it should be remembered that the same fragment striking 
his eye could have caused permanent disability. 
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The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
internal investigators identified confusion over who was responsible during the press visit. The 
presence of senior staff seems to have led the Supervisor to presume that precautions would 
be taken without his giving instructions. He also decided not to use protective works despite 
there being a valuable fruit tree nearby, which was an error. 
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because the SOP (and presumably 
training materials) did not cover the safety distances required when destroying the devices 
expected in the area. The International demining NGO were quick to correct this fault. 
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